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Abstract
The security of computer networks and systems on
the Internet is a growing and ongoing set of concerns
for nation states, corporations, and individuals.
Although substantial and valuable work is in progress
to secure the hardware and software technologies of
the Internet, less attention has been paid to the
everyday practices of the people involved in
maintaining this infrastructure. In this paper, we focus
on issues in cybersecurity as they apply to computer
networks, to show how effective practices of network
security are premised upon social relationships of trust
formed within communities of cybersecurity
professionals, and enacted in the practice of
cybersecurity. We describe three key cybersecurity
problems that involve Internet infrastructural
technologies: IP address hijacking, email spam, and
DNS spoofing. Through our analysis of these three
problems, we argue that social trust between people –
not just assurances built into the underlying
technologies – must be emphasized as a central aspect
of securing Internet infrastructure.

1. Introduction
The Internet is characterized by relationships of
interdependence. Thousands of individual computer
networks interconnect to form the Internet, relying on
each other to carry data traffic from origin to
destination. The resolution of domain names to Internet
protocol (IP) addresses takes place through relations
within the quasi-hierarchical structure of the Domain
Name System (DNS). The delivery of some of the
most common and essential data, such as email, takes
place through arbitrary relations between email servers
around the world.
The intertwined technological systems of the
Internet are constructed through relationships between
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independent, autonomous organizations of people who,
often invisibly, administer these interconnected
systems. Thus, the practice of cybersecurity, broadly
construed, is concerned with ensuring the stable,
reliable operation of interdependent relationships
among these human organizations as well as the
technological systems they manage.
We draw on critical studies of infrastructure, to
frame cybersecurity for Internet infrastructure as a
system of inter-related social and technological
elements [26][27][28]. Studies of infrastructure have,
in general, focused on the processes through which
infrastructure is designed, developed and deployed, at
scales ranging from localized project-specific contexts
to a societal level. In contrast, we are concerned with
infrastructural mechanisms of relative stasis, rather
than change: once deployed, how is an infrastructure
maintained as a stable, ordered system? This is not to
say that infrastructure is static in our view, but that
relative stasis – predictable, repeatable behavior – is a
primary goal for infrastructure once deployed, just as
much as relative change (however slow) is a primary
goal for infrastructure in the process of design,
development and deployment. A focus on relative
stasis in infrastructure calls to attention the processes
through which failures occur and are managed to
assure order and stability in infrastructure. The analysis
of the relationship between relative stasis and failure
requires study of problems of risk in infrastructure, and
the associated practices and structures involved in
maintenance (as responses to unintentional, but
possibly anticipated, failures) and security (as
responses to intentional attacks).
The issues of maintenance and security for
infrastructure become substantially more complex once
we consider problems of interdependence: the stable
operation of an infrastructure is premised upon stable
relationships between interdependent systems, as much
as on the stable operation of the individual systems
themselves. This is especially true when the sociotechnical relationships between the interdependent

2341

systems composing an infrastructure cut across
territorial and organizational boundaries, as is the case
with the Internet in general, and cybersecurity in
particular.
A key problem that any relationship of mutual
interdependence must address is what is at stake in an
interaction, which is most commonly referred to as risk
[5]. To date, the dominant view on cybersecurity is that
risk can be managed through primarily technological
solutions, assisted by economic analysis of incentives
and appropriate legal frameworks [20][21][22][23]. As
we argue, however, such solutions invariably
underestimate the critical importance of the social
relationships within the communities of technical
personnel who manage and control these infrastructural
technologies. In our view, trust as a social solution to
managing risk has received insufficient attention in the
analysis and design of the Internet's infrastructural
technologies, especially from a perspective of
cybersecurity. We argue that social trust is inherent to
the interdependent nature of the Internet infrastructure,
and it must be considered as a central problem in
cybersecurity.
In this paper, we detail the specific ways in which
risk manifests – and is managed – in three distinct
infrastructural technologies of the Internet. To evaluate
these cases, we draw from three years of ethnographic
fieldwork in communities of the Internet's technical
personnel, across North America and South Asia,
spanning regional professional organizations and
global governance bodies, which we detail below. Our
aim is not to provide a comprehensive empirical
analysis of each of the cases from this larger research,
but rather to summarize and contextualize these cases
as significant illustrations in support of our argument.
First, we examine the problem of IP address
hijacking, a class of attack in which one computer
network claims to host a range of IP addresses which in
actuality are hosted by another network. Second, we
present the problem of email spam, which is among the
most easily visible forms of risk that Internet users
commonly experience. Finally, we analyze the problem
of DNS spoofing, in which a DNS server sends
spurious responses to clients, directing them to IP
addresses other than those of the service which they
requested.
We chose these three cases because they each
illustrate different types of risk that must be mitigated
in order to maintain the security and reliability of the

Internet infrastructure. Through a descriptive analysis
of these three problem areas, we show how social trust
is integral to the practice of operating the technological
infrastructure of the Internet. We focus on the nature
of interdependence in the technological system, the
quality of the risks that result, and the role that social
trust relations play in the management of these risks.
Finally, we conclude our analysis with a series of
specific recommendations about how social trust can
be emphasized in both the study and practice of
maintaining a secure and reliable Internet.

2. Trust and Interdependence
Trust is a complex construct that has many different
definitions and meanings in social science, computer
science, and related disciplines. However, all
conceptions of trust seek to address a common
problem: the management of expectations in the face
of potentially risky, uncertain interactions. Before
applying the concept of trust to our specific
cybersecurity problems, we first review the key
differences in trust and trust-related terms.
Individual models of interpersonal trust focus on
why one person might choose to take a risk on another,
calling attention to individual attitudes, emotional
content and cognitive dimensions. Since no-one can
ever have complete knowledge to anticipate another
person's behavior, the ability to trust is essential to
social interactions [1]. In contrast, system trust
describes the trust that individuals must have in the
infrastructures – such as water, electricity and
communications – that support everyday life. In the
absence of any meaningful understanding or power
over how these infrastructures function, the trust that
individuals have in the reliable operation of these
infrastructures is premised upon confidence that they
will not fail, rather than an active choice taken with
knowledge of risk [2][3].
Since our concern is with interdependence in
social-technical systems, we adopt a model of trust
which takes human relationships as its primary
building block [4][5][6]. In this model, trust is
conceived of as a three part relation, in which one
person trusts another in relation to a specific action.
For instance, it is not uncommon for individuals to ask
strangers to watch their bags at the airport for a few
minutes, but it is unlikely that someone might ask a
stranger to watch a child in the same context. Trust is
not merely a matter of the relationship between two
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people, but also of the magnitude of the risks in a
particular context.
In the above examples, an expectation of trust is
made possible through the evaluation of whether or not
a person is trustworthy. At an airport, this might simply
be a matter of trust-warranting cues [6]: for example,
what the stranger looks like, how they are dressed, etc.
In ongoing interactions, however, the evaluation of
trustworthiness may arise from reputation constructed
through knowledge of prior interactions. For instance,
a regular customer of a neighborhood shop may be
trusted by the shop owner to run up a tab, while a
customer visiting the shop for the first time would
likely be asked to pay immediately.
This conception of trust implies an ability to choose
whether or not to trust, and whom to trust: in the
absence of choice, what is colloquially referred to as
‘trust’ may be better described as a confidence in
expected outcomes [7]. Confidence is made possible
through assurance structures which are designed to
minimize risk. Assurance structures may be centralized
authorities (as in central banks assuring that paper
money has value) or social norms (as in punishments
such as exclusion or other penalties) which ensure that
expectations are met in social relationships [8]. In
everyday life, ongoing interpersonal relationships
between parties often function through some mix of
trust and assurances.
Trust relationships and assurance structures are
produced and reproduced in professional communities
and institutional forms, and enacted in the everyday
practice of administering Internet infrastructure.
Individuals enter into trust relationships in order to be
effective in their practice, forming these relationships
through engagement with communities of practice [9]
of technical personnel involved in managing the
everyday operation of Internet infrastructure. These
communities, practices and trust relationships are in
turn anchored by assurance structures, which
encompass behavioral norms in the operation of
technology (often characterized and documented as
“best practices”) as well as organizational forms
specialized to administer particular aspects of
technology.
We follow these lines of analysis in the cases we
present below, to show that while the nature of risk and
uncertainty can and should be characterized in
technological terms, the responses to risk and
uncertainty must be analyzed in terms of practices

engaged in by professional communities, enabled
through social trust relationships and assurance
structures.

3. Methods and Materials
The cases we present in the sections which follow
are based on three years of ethnographic fieldwork in
communities of the Internet's technical personnel
across North America and South Asia. Over 50 semistructured interviews were conducted in the course of
this research, alongside participant observation during
meetings and conferences of professional associations
and governance bodies involved in the operation of
Internet infrastructure. In addition, a variety of textual
materials generated by the technical communities
represented by these organizations were analyzed,
including email lists, best practices documents, policy
documents and standards documents.
Fieldwork was concentrated on regionally
organized professional communities of network
administrators in North America and South Asia: the
North American Network Operators Group (NANOG)
and the South Asia Network Operators Group
(SANOG). In addition, fieldwork was conducted at the
Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working
Group
(M3AAWG),
a
consortium
broadly
representative of the email industry, the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which sets technical
standards for Internet infrastructure, and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) which oversees the unique allocation of
resources (such as domain names and IP addresses) for
the global Internet.
We chose these particular professional communities
since they presented a basis for the analysis of
interrelationships in Internet infrastructure across
geographies and functions. The relational comparison
between NANOG and SANOG serves to illustrate the
differences and connections between the North
American context, which is relatively central to
Internet infrastructure, and the South Asian context,
which is relatively peripheral. Research into the
M3AAWG, IETF and ICANN alongside NANOG and
SANOG supported the analysis of the relationships
between the everyday practices of network operations,
and the functions of industry coordination, standards
development and resource allocation for Internet
infrastructure. For a detailed discussion and analysis of
the themes from this research, see [24].
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4. Risk in Interdependent Systems: Three
Cases

has knowledge of which neighbor it should use to
reach a particular IP address.

In the cases which we present here, we build on the
concepts established in the prior section. In each case,
we describe the nature of risk and interdependence in
the technological system under study. We then examine
the combination of trust relationships and assurance
structures – and the professional communities,
practices and organizational forms through which these
are realized – that stabilize and order the technological
system. As we will show, social trust is an integral
component of the practice of managing these systems,
and must be understood as such, rather than as a
problem to be engineered away.

BGP is amongst the most essential infrastructural
technologies of the Internet. In the absence of the
interconnections enabled by BGP, there would be no
Internet.
As critical as BGP is to the correct functioning of
the Internet, it provides no mechanisms for a network
to establish the veracity of the routing claims received
from neighboring networks. Any network may claim to
be able to carry traffic to any IP address block using
BGP. Immediate neighbors can verify the authenticity
of these claims for IP address blocks which a network
is authorized to originate (i.e., for IP addresses which
reach computers within that network). However, it is
much more difficult to establish veracity when dealing
with routing announcements claiming the ability to
carry traffic to IP address blocks in remote networks.
In order to reach a given destination IP address, traffic
from one network often needs to transit several
intermediary networks. The network from which the
traffic originates has no way of knowing whether or
not any of these intermediaries can actually carry the
traffic to its intended destination.

4.1. IP Address Hijacking
As of this writing, the Internet is composed of over
55,000 interconnected computer networks [10]. Each
computer network originates one or more blocks of IP
address space, which are used to address computers
located within that network. IP address hijacking
occurs when one network attempts to capture data
traffic actually intended for another network.
Networks can carry traffic intended for other
networks, and in fact often need to do so. A network
operated by an organization, or an Internet service
provider, may pay a larger network which provides
regional connectivity, to carry data traffic within a
geographical region. A regional network may in turn
pay an even larger network to carry traffic across
regions, and continents. It is through this system of
interconnections between networks, spanning different
geographical scales, that the global Internet is realized.
The technology which enables the interconnection
of networks is called the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP). Using BGP, networks announce the IP address
blocks to which they can carry traffic to their
neighboring networks. These neighbors in turn
announce these IP address blocks to their neighboring
networks, and so on. If the same IP address block is
received from two neighbors (i.e., there are multiple
possible routes to the same destination), a network
administrator configures local routing policy to prefer
one neighbor over another, depending on a range of
variables, such as bandwidth and diversity of points of
interconnection and the cost of carrying traffic. The
result is a distributed routing system – called the interdomain routing system – through which every network

Although the everyday experience of the Internet is
stable – traffic is correctly delivered to expected
destinations – spurious announcements of routing
information in BGP are not an uncommon occurrence,
whether as mistakes of configuration, or as intentional
efforts to redirect and capture traffic [11][12][13].
These kinds of attacks are known as IP address
hijacking, in which one network hijacks traffic
intended for the IP address blocks of another network.
The only effective remedy currently in place
against IP address hijacking is the “prefix filter”, which
is documented as a best current practice by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which sets technical
standards for the Internet [14]. If a network knows the
list of IP address blocks which a neighbor is authorized
to originate, it may use a prefix filter to block the
announcement of any IP address blocks outside the
authorized list. This approach works well when a
network is dealing with neighboring networks who
only announce their own IP address space (such as a
campus network, or a data center), and do not carry
traffic for any other networks.
However – as we have already noted – it becomes
infeasible to apply prefix filters when dealing with
networks which do carry traffic for other networks.
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Under these conditions, the only meaningful response
is one of trust. Administrators responsible for operating
a network must trust that their counterparts in
neighboring networks will follow best practices in
securing their networks, and ensure that they will not
be the source of an IP address hijacking event. In the
process of setting up and maintaining an
interconnection between networks, administrators in
each network will often have to communicate with
each other, and in the process form a sense of each
other's competency, and over repeated interactions
build a social relationship of trust. In the instance that a
prefix hijacking event (or other network security issue
which affects neighbors) occurs, both the technical
relationship of interconnection and the social
relationship of trust will be re-evaluated, and in
extreme cases, terminated. Commenting on the
importance of interpersonal trust relationships, a
network administrator told us, “[trust] is pretty big
because if you’ve got a good contact in your upstream
[network] for example, and you can at least talk to
them, and get something done, or if there’s nastiness
emanating from one particular network, then it’s good
if you can talk to somebody because really, if you don’t
have good contacts, the chances of influencing
anything is pretty slim really, right.”
It is not only in the practice and process of network
interconnection that social trust relationships are
formed between network administrators. Trust
relationships are also formed at meetings of regionally
organized professional communities of network
administrators, such as the North America Network
Operators Group (NANOG), the South Asian Network
Operators Group (SANOG), and many more. Meetings
of these groups typically occur between 2 and 3 times
every year across locations within their geographies,
with ongoing discussion of computer networking
issues on dedicated email lists. Socializing in person,
making presentations, and participating in workshops
at these meetings all contribute to the formation of
social trust relationships between attendees, and the
evaluation of reputation (for running a well-behaved
network, and for technical knowledge) within a
community. A senior member of the NANOG
community summed up these dynamics in an
interview: “Certainly NANOG is one of the places …
where you can become a trusted individual … where
you can get up and talk about problems that you’re
seeing in the network, to get other people together that
are seeing the same problem, to generate more push to
get the processes changed, and [Internet Service

Providers] work with each other. I see that as very
important.”
The stability of the critical Internet infrastructure of
interconnections between networks is assured through
trust relationships formed in the practice of network
interconnection and in professional communities of
network administrators.

4.2. Email Spam
Email spam is a problem that is almost as old as the
Internet itself [15]. Whether as advertising, scams, or
other communications, email spam is universally
unwanted.
The fundamental problem for email is one of
openness, which is similar in many ways to that for
network
interconnection.
Just
as
network
interconnection should allow any IP address on the
Internet to send and receive any traffic from any other
IP address, email assumes that any email server should
be able to send and receive any email from any other
email server. Open systems provide for great autonomy
and ease of interconnectivity, but introduce significant
problems of interdependence at the same time. Anyone
can set up an email server under their own control,
configure it as they wish, and immediately be able to
send and receive email from any other email server
with no additional effort. The problem, of course, is
that such an open system also provides the grounds
upon which spam may be sent and received with
similar ease.
A common defense against spam, which anyone
who uses email is familiar with, is the spam filter,
which attempts to distinguish spam from legitimate
email. However, spam filters only sort spam at its
destination, once it has been delivered. From a network
security perspective, it is preferable to stop spam as
close to its origin as possible, to save bandwidth,
storage and processor cycles for email servers. This is
especially concerning, since recent estimates indicate
that spam is well over 50% of all email [16]. In this
section, we describe the mechanisms through which
network level anti-spam efforts are made possible.
In the early days of the Internet, stopping spam was
often simply a matter of contacting the administrator of
the email server originating spam, and asking them to
suspend the offending email account. This was a viable
approach at the time, since there was a relatively small
number of email servers, and most email server
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administrators knew one another [15]. As the Internet
grew, and the number of email servers increased, it
became unreasonable to combat spam through personal
relationships among email server administrators. In
contrast with BGP, where each computer network is
directly connected to only a limited set of other
computer networks, every email server is potentially
connected to every other email server on the Internet,
drastically
increasing
the
complexity
of
interdependence in this system.
The solutions to the problem of spam have
therefore necessarily taken the form of assurance
structures. A variety of for-profit and non-profit entities
(such as SpamHaus, SORBS, SpamCop and others)
provide regularly updated lists of email servers that are
primarily sources of spam which should be blocked.
Block lists vary from being manually maintained, to
those which look for patterns of spam in email to
automatically identify spam sources. Email server
operators may choose to subscribe to one or more of
these block lists to identify email servers from which
they should not accept any inbound email, or which
they treat as a spam source to which additional policy
must be applied before delivering email.
In the instance that an email server operator feels
that they have been wrongly categorized as a spam
source by a block list, they must follow guidelines
published on block list websites to facilitate their
removal. These guidelines are typically purely
technical in nature, such as requiring that the
proportion of spam has been below a certain threshold
for a certain period of time before removal from the
block list.
The relationship between email senders, email
receivers and block lists is complicated by the fact that
advertisers (or email services providing support for
advertisers) do need to send large quantities of email,
while at the same time avoiding being listed on block
lists. In many ways, the behavior of a large advertiser
can resemble that of a spam source. The notion of what
is, and is not, spam is no longer as straightforward
when considering these commercial relationships.
The organizational space in which these tensions
are worked out in practice is the Messaging, Mobile
and Malware Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3WAAG).
This is an international industry consortium which was
initially created as a space for coordination between
email services, and later expanded to include issues of
messaging on mobile phones, and of malware.

M3AAWG meets three times a year, across locations in
Europe and North America, with ongoing
communications on several email lists. Presentations
and discussions at M3AAWG often deal with making
sense of best practices among the diverse interests
represented at M3AAWG. These discussions may
eventually be published as best practice documents, for
consumption beyond the core M3AAWG membership.
For instance, the Vetting Best Common Practices
document [17] deals with processes that email service
providers should follow in signing up new customers,
to ensure that these customers do not use the email
service provider's infrastructure to send spam. Over
lunch at a M3AAWG meeting in San Francisco, a
Brazilian email operator related his interests in
attending the M3AAWG meeting, in spite of the time
and money involved in travel from Brazil: “this is a
place to network, to build trust amongst different
groups, coordinate and collaborate, and get a sense of
what different parties' interests are: hosting providers,
email service providers, law enforcement…”.
Attendance at M3AAWG meetings is limited to
employees of M3AAWG member organizations and
their guests. Admission to membership in M3AAWG is
controlled by the M3AAWG board, which adjudicates
new membership applications – and conducts annual
reviews of existing memberships – based on whether
or not an organization is recognized as a responsible
well-behaved actor within the messaging ecosystem. 1
Unlike the regional network operator groups surveyed
in the last section, which are open for anyone to attend,
M3AAWG intentionally limits attendance to ensure
that bad actors are unable to participate in the sensemaking around the policy and practice of messaging.
For example, our attendance at M3AAWG meetings
was only made possible through a guest invitation
facilitated by a M3AAWG member organization.
Every presentation we attended at M3AAWG was
prefaced with a notice reminding attendees that the
contents of the presentation were not to be publicized
outside the context of the M3AAWG meeting.
Even though the everyday practice of combating
email spam relies on the assurance structures of block
lists, the processes through which notions of best
practice and policy are formed take place through trust
relationships in a professional community anchored by
the organizational form of M3AAWG.

1

See https://www.m3aawg.org/join for details, last retrieved June 9th,
2016.
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4.3. Domain Name Spoofing
The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the
means through which a human-readable name for a
service on the Internet is resolved to an IP address
through which to reach the computer system providing
the service. DNS is used in almost any interaction that
occurs in everyday use of the Internet, resolving names
to IP addresses for web servers, email servers, file
servers, and more. Accordingly, there is great power in
the operation of DNS servers: a rogue DNS server
operator may spoof domain names, resolving domain
names to IP addresses of their choosing, intercepting
all traffic to those domain names, and modifying it at
will, potentially impersonating a service to gather login
credentials and other sensitive information.
DNS functions through a hierarchy of servers.
Whenever a lookup is performed on DNS, the request
initially goes to one of the root servers, which returns
the IP address of the server for the top-level domain
(such as “.com”, “.org” or “.net”) in the requested
domain name. The request is then redirected to the
server for the top-level domain, which in turn returns
the address of the server for requested domain (such as
“hicss.org”). This process may continue, recursively,
until all dot-delimited names have been exhausted to
find the IP address of the machine providing a
particular service (such as “www.hicss.org”).
The apparently hierarchical structure of DNS is
complicated by the fact that Internet service providers
and other large organizational networks (such as
campus networks) may operate their own local DNS
servers. Whenever a user within a network looks up a
domain name, the request goes to their local DNS
server, which then mediates the process of recursively
resolving the domain name from the root DNS servers.
Local DNS servers are points of control at which the
resolution of domain names to IP addresses may be
spoofed.
In response to the problem of domain name
spoofing, a set of extensions to secure DNS were
developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force,
collectively termed DNSSEC. These extensions
provide mechanisms for end user systems to detect
spoofing, and alert users to such behavior. DNSSEC
functions by cryptographically signing the root DNS
zone, which holds all top-level domains, and is
maintained on the DNS root servers. Each top-level
domain server in turn cryptographically signs all names
which it hosts, and so on down the hierarchy of DNS

servers. Each key used for cryptographically signing a
level of the DNS hierarchy is itself signed by the key
of the level above. As a result, an end user system can
verify a technological chain of trust leading to the root
zone, and detect if this chain has been modified in any
way.
The problem is that such an arrangement is
premised upon a single root cryptographic key to
maintain both authentication and control over the
whole system. The introduction of DNSSEC led to
concerns in DNS operator community over
accountability in the control and use of the root key.
The root key for DNSSEC is maintained by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a non-profit entity which oversees the
management of domain names, IP addresses, and other
critical Internet resources for the global Internet. In the
process of deploying DNSSEC, ICANN created the
Trusted Community Representative position. Trusted
Community Representatives are members of the
Internet's technical community who observe the key
signing process at data centers operated by ICANN,
and hold fragments of root key, to allow it to be
reconstituted in the event that it is lost.2
As
much
as
the
Trusted
Community
Representatives play an important role in maintaining
the root key, they play an even more important role in
securing the legitimacy of ICANN's control of
DNSSEC. As several DNS operators told us, even
though they might not trust ICANN as an organization,
they trust ICANN's operation of DNSSEC insofar as
people who they trust – appointed as Trusted
Community Representatives – vouch for the integrity
of the DNSSEC process. The assurance structure for
DNSSEC gains legitimacy from trust relationships and
reputation maintained by Trusted Community
Representatives within the broader communities of
administrators who are responsible for operating DNS
servers, and implementing DNSSEC for their own
domains.

5. Trust in Technology, Trust in People
Each of the three cases surveyed above deals with
distinctively interdependent technological forms, but
the solutions to risk and uncertainty in each case may
be made understood in terms of social trust
2

For a list of Trusted Community Representative, see
https://www.iana.org/dnssec/tcrs, last retrieved June 9th, 2016.
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relationships
articulated
through
professional
communities and practices. In each case, combinations
of trust relationships and assurance structures serve to
stabilize and order interdependent technological
systems, balancing individual autonomy and
centralized control.
IP address hijacking is mitigated through the
technological mechanism of prefix filters, and social
relationships of trust in the practice of interconnecting
networks. These trust relationships and practices are
produced and reproduced in professional communities
of network administrators. The result is a system which
has a high degree of autonomy for individual computer
networks, and very little centralized control.
Block lists represent the key technological
assurance structure through which email spam is
mitigated. Email service providers and block list
providers have substantial autonomy in their
operations, and very little direct control over each
another. Instead, coordination and collaboration occur
among these diverse actors through trust relationships
formed within the restricted community of M3AAWG,
in the interests of constructing and evaluating
trustworthiness, and collective sense-making for the
practices and policies involved in operating email
services.
DNSSEC provides a highly effective antidote to
domain name spoofing, but at the cost of a certain
degree of autonomy for DNS server operators. The
legitimacy of ICANN as the assurance structure
maintaining the root key for DNSSEC needs the
support of Trusted Community Representatives:
technologists with strong reputations and trust
relationships in the broader technical communities
responsible for deploying and operating DNSSEC.
Across these cases, trust is not a social value
embedded in technological form so much as it is
necessary element of technological practice, realized in
social relations and communities. Efforts to secure
computer systems and networks often focus on
implementing more secure “trustworthy” technological
forms. While we do support these efforts, we approach
them with the caution that they provide surety, or
confidence, rather than trust [18], reposing all authority
in technology, often implemented through strong
assurance structures of centralized control. Such
systems are potentially brittle, susceptible to global
technological failure, and political capture of
centralized controls. In contrast, a system which

privileges social trust relationships is prone to local
failures, but more resilient as a whole, though it
requires substantial investment in distributed
communities and practices for reliable operation.
Here lies the trust paradox: highly autonomous
systems with weak assurance structures lead to strong
trust relationships, while highly controlled systems
with strong assurance structures do away with the need
for trust relationships [19]. As we have argued, the
answer is not to choose either trust relationships or
assurance structures, but to imagine a combination of
both. A trustworthy computing system may be
designed with a strong assurance structure; but this
assurance structure still needs legitimacy from the
communities of practice who will be subject to it in
order gain acceptance for its authority. Similarly, a
computing system may be designed with strong trust
relationships in mind; but this system will still need to
take into account the effort involved in developing
professional communities of practice to anchor these
trust relationships, and the potential assurance
structures which may yet be required by the system.

6. A Path Forward: Accounting for Social
Trust in Internet Infrastructure
Cybersecurity is typically characterized in terms of
problems of attack and defense, of incentives and
compliance, and of technological design. While all of
these are necessary and valuable approaches to
cybersecurity, we argue that the application of
cybersecurity to interdependent systems – such as
those which we have described here – calls for
attention to problems of social trust.
It is necessary, but not sufficient, for instance, to
examine incentive structures for the deployment of
secure extensions to technology, such as DNSSEC.
Equally, the political problem of maintaining the
legitimacy – the trustworthiness – of the authority
managing the DNSSEC root is a critical issue.
Incentives and legal regimes can account for the forces
driving competing organizations together in the
formation of M3AAWG. However, these alone are
insufficient to understand the functioning of
M3AAWG as a community with a restricted
membership forming trust relationships and common
understandings of practice around the mitigation of
email spam. Similarly, the function of professional
communities of network operators cannot be explained
only in terms of incentives and regulations around
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particular aspects of network interconnection. Thick
relationships of trust and common understandings of
practice are formed within these communities, easing
the coordination and collaboration needed in the
everyday practice of network interconnection.
The design of new technologies intended to provide
more secure networked computing environments must
take into account the social trust required in the
practice of operating these systems. This is especially
true when a system is composed of interdependent
components, spanning territorial and organizational
contexts. In such cases, professional communities of
technical personnel responsible for the everyday
operation of these systems must be seeded and
supported to provide spaces for the production of trust
relationships and sense-making around shared concepts
of “best practices” for operating these systems. For
example, NANOG was created and initially funded
under the auspices of the US National Science
Foundation, to support a professional community for
coordination between the technical personnel involved
in operating the computer networks of the early
Internet [24].
At the same time, careful attention must be paid to
the technological form of the system. Does it require a
single central authority for its reliable operation? Does
it allow for multiple optional authorities? In each case,
the question of how these authorities might maintain
their legitimacy and trustworthiness is critical, and
must be addressed with the technical communities who
rely on these authorities in their everyday practice.
These kinds of issues are very apparent in the
deployment of DNSSEC, and in ongoing efforts to
secure BGP which similarly rely on centralized
authorities to assure security [25].
The functioning of the interdependent systems of
Internet infrastructure must be understood in terms of
shared understandings of practice, formed between
geographically distributed communities, supported by
trustworthy assurance structures. Such analysis is
complicated by variations in market structures and
legal regimes across geographies and over time,
alongside evolutions in technological form. These
varying pressures can be difficult to make sense of,
both internally for those involved in operating a
system, and externally, for those aiming to analyze
existing systems and design new systems. However,
social trust relationships offer the necessary lubrication
and glue to ease and maintain the operation of these

systems in the face of complex interactions of market
structures, legal regimes and technological forms [24].
These are but a few guidelines for thinking about
how to support trustworthy social operational
environments for secure networked computing
systems, as necessary adjuncts to technological,
economic and legal analysis. Through the ongoing
growth and evolution of these systems, it is important
to continue to pay attention to the ethical dilemmas and
social norms which emerge in the practices of technical
communities. As the cases which we have presented
illustrate, there are ample precedents in the
development of Internet infrastructure to draw from in
thinking about the design of future secure technologies.
Designing systems with social values of trust in
mind is as much a political and social problem as it is a
technological problem. It is essential that social trust be
taken as a primary object of study in the analysis of the
complex interdependent systems which make up the
critical infrastructure of the Internet.
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